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VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 22 NOVEMBER, 1969 NUMBER 6
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children
Caught in the Conflict of Laws
Brigitte M. Bodenheimer*
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uni/brm State
Laws has approved and recommended for enactment in all the states a
Unibrin Child Custody Jurisdiction Act., This Act is designed to
alleviate the plight of "interstate children'"'-an apt phrase coined by
Professor Ehrenzweig and descriptive of the rootlessness of children
shijted fron state to state-who are the victims of eustody battles often
Jbught in the courts of iore than one state or a state and a Jbreign
country. In this article, Mrs. Bodenheimer, Reporter for the Special
Committee which drafted the Act, describes the social and legal causes
of the problem and explains the essential features of the Unijbrm A ct.
The Jiul text of the Act is printed as an appendix to this article.
I. THE PROBLEM
There are at least three million children of divorce under eighteen years of age in
the U.S. today, and the divorce courts are adding about 300,000 more children
to this group each year . . . .The manner in which the courts deal with these
* Research Associate in Law, University of California, Davis; J.U.D., Heidelberg; LL.B.,
University of Washington; Member of the Bars of Washington and Utah. The author was
Reporter for the Special Committee of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws which
prepared the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act.
I. The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act was adopted at the annual meeting of the
Commissioners at Philadelphia in July, 1968, and approved by the American Bar Association in
August. 1968. Printed copies of the Act with Prefatory Note and Comments may be obtained
from the National Conference of Commissioners. The Act without comments is printed as an
Appendix to this article.
2. See Ehrenzweig, The Interstate Child and Uniform Legislation: A Plea for Extralitigious
Proceedings, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 1 (1965).
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victims of domestic catastrophe has an impact, directly or indirectly, on a
substantial proportion of our people. It presents a challenge to the stability of our
social institutions and is assuming threatening significance
If the large number of other children who have been abandoned,
neglected, or cruelly treated, or who have been orphaned by death or
severe illness, were added to the children of divorce, we would find that
innumerable children in the United States live under court-determined
custody arrangements. Not all of these children are involved in custody
disputes when the initial custody decree is rendered, since often there
is no real choice of custodians and frequently there is agreement among
the parties. Many of these children, however, are faced with a potential
shift to another home, especially when a modification of the original
decree is applied for in a court of another state. A child left behind
after a fatal accident, for example, may have been awarded to the only
relative who stepped forward willing to assume his care, but two years
later another relative in another state may petition for the child's
custody A divorce decree may have awarded custody of the children
to the father in accordance with an agreement of the parties, but later
the mother, who has the children with her on a visit or who has
snatched them from the father in an unguarded moment, may insist in
another state that she alone can properly care for the children.'
Naturally, not all the custody change applications are granted, but the
number of children shifted from state to state every year in the hope
of winning a custody change is so large that the matter has become a
national problem.
Any psychiatrist or psychologist, experienced parent, grandparent,
or teacher will state that when there has already been one upheaval in
the child's life due to divorce or some other misfortune, the first and
foremost requirement fo" the child's health and proper growth is
stability, security, and continuity. Dr. Andrew Watson, psychiatrist
and professor of law, has said that stability is "practically the principal
element in .raising children, especially pre-puberty ones," and that "a
child can handle almost anything better than he can handle
3. Fain, 1963 PROCEEDINGS. SECTION OF FAMILY LAW, A.B.A., in READINGS IN LAW AND
PSYCHIATRY 316 (R. Allen, E. Ferster & J. Rubin eds. 1968).
4. Cf. In re Fore, 168 Ohio St. 363, 155 N.E.2d 194 (1958).
5. (f. Hansen & Goldberg, Casework in a Family Court, in READINGS IN LAW AND
PSYCHIATRY, supra note 3, at 330, which describes an intrastate custody award to the father which
was agreed to by the mother purely for reasons of divorce strategy and with the resolve "to wait
until a more opportune time" to petition for modificatior
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instability."' Furthermore, Dr. Watson maintains that "poor parental
models are easier to adapt to than ever shifting ones." '7 Similarly, Dr.
Herbert Modlin of the Menninger Foundation stresses the importance
of "constancy of mothering" and describes the characteristics of
children in the various periods of preadolescent and preadult existence
in which their needs vary somewhat, but there is always the
requirement of continuity and a sense of family, satisfying a need to
belong.'
A growing child's need for stability of environment and constancy
of affection, especially when subjected to the trauma of a disintegrated
home, seems today a well-accepted fact,9 verifying old truths gathered
from long experience of mankind. Among the legal writers expressing
this view is Professor Homer Clark:
One of the things that the child's welfare certainly demands is stability and
regularity. If he is continuously being transferred from one parent to the other by
conflicting court decrees, he may be a great deal worse off than if left with one
parent, even though as an original proposition some better provision could have
been made for him. 0
Dr. Watson concludes that custody decisions once made "should
nearly always be permanent and irrevocable."" Similarly, Professor
Robert Levy proposes that custody decrees normally remain immutable
for at least one or two years.'
Present law and judicial practice are strangely at odds with these
realities and insights. The cardinal rule of custody law is that the court
must be governed above all by a concern for the best interests or
6. PROCEEDINGS OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM DIVORCE AND MARRIAGE ACT,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 98, 101 (Dec. 15-16,
1968).
7. A. VATSON. PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS 197 (1968). See also id. at 159.
8. READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY, supra note 3, at 319-22. See also Plant, The
Psychiatrist Views Children of Divorced Parents, 10 LAW & CONTE.MP. PROB. 807, 812-14, 816
(1944).
9. See Preface to A. WATSON. supra note 7, at xi-xii.
10. H. CLARK. THE LAW OF DOIESTIC RELATIONS 326 (1968). See also Application of
Lang, 9 App. Div. 2d 401, 409, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763, 771 (Sup. Ct. 1959): "'[G]enerally, the custody
of children is to be established, whenever possible, on a long-term basis."
II. A. WATSON. supra note 7, at 197. See also Michigan H.B. No. 2842, introduced in
1968, which was designed to put Dr. Watson's ideas into practice.
12. R. LEVY. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE LEGISLATION: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
237 (1969). See also Goldstein & Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds Jbr Divorce: A Model Statute
& Comuentar.r 3 FAi. L.Q. 75, 88 (1969), suggesting that custody decisions be final if reached
under proposed legislative guides. Cf. Professor Foster's suggestion that custody decrees rendered
by a court of another jurisdiction remain unmodified for two years under normal circumstances.
Mim. memorandum 4 (March 25, 1965).
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welfare of the child. Other considerations enter into the initial custody
decision, particularly the parents' desires to bring up their own
children. But once a custody arrangement has been made with the
blessings of a court, is it generally in the best interests of the child that
a court, and particularly a court which has had no part in or
information about the original custody decision, modify the decree?"3
The power to modify custody awards may originally have been merely
the natural consequence of an equity-type proceeding in which the
chancellor retained jurisdiction to make any necessary adjustments,
intended to be used sparingly and under extraordinary circumstances.
But whatever its origin, the notion that non-finality, fluidity, and
modifiability of custody decrees are necessary in the interest of the
child became generally accepted.
This unfortunate assumption is implicit in a number of leading
Supreme Court cases. It was, in fact, clearly articulated by Justice
Frankfurter in Kovacs v. Brewer:
Because the child's welfare is the controlling guide in custody detertiniation, a
custody decree is of an essentially transitory nature. The passage of even a
relatively short period of time may work great changes, although difficult of
ascertainment, in the needs of a developing child. Subtle, almost imperceptible,
changes in the fitness and adaptability of custodians to provide for such needs may
develop with corresponding rapidity. A court that is called upon to determine to
whom and under what circumstances custody of an infant will be granted cannot,
if it is to perform its function responsibly, be bound by a prior decree of another
court. .... 1
This assumption has particularly harmful effects when "interstate
children" are involved, that is, when a court of another state is called
upon to change a custody decree. A judge may often be disinclined to
change his own custody decree or that of a colleague on the bench of
his own state, but when the decree of another state is involved, there
are no external controls to counteract the sense of power and
competition that sometimes prevails. The second judge may believe that
13. We are not here concerned with emergency measures which any state may take to
protect a child within its borders, whether the child lives under a court custody order or in the
legal custody of his natural parents. Nor are we concerned with adjustments in visitation
arrangements, or with any changes in support obligations which are in any event not part of the
custody decision itself. We are concerned with a change in the home itself and in the person or
persons who have been parents, natural or designated, to the child, under the custody decree.
14. 356 U.S. 604, 612 (1958) (emphasis added). See also New York ex rel. Halvey v.
Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). The need for stability of environment is mentioned by some writers,
but a simultaneous requirement of non-finality seems to have been considered the stronger of the
two. See, e.g., Stumberg, The Status of Children in the ConJlict oJ Laws, 8 U. Ciii. L. Riv. 42,
56-57 (1940). For a possible explanation, see note 19 infra.
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he can do better for the child-or perhaps better for the local
petitioner:
I suppose that one of the fundamental difficulties in the situation is that trial
judges (if not appellate judges, as well) are somewhat loath to defer to courts of
other states. This may be due to a tendency of any individual to think that in a
situation demanding the wisdom of Solomon he can come closer than anyone else.
And there is always the suspicion that even a judge will be a little more
sympathetic with a constituent. 5
This tendency of each state to act independently and without regard to
the prior pronouncements of other states is not held in check in the area
of child custody law by the full faith and credit clause of the
Constitution or by any clear rules of jurisdiction applicable to
modifications of out-of-state custody awards. The case of New York
ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey," decided in 1947, removed any doubt that
custody decrees modifiable in the state of origin may. be freely changed
by the courts of other states. While Justice Douglas, who wrote the
majority opinion, avoided passing directly upon the applicability of the
full faith and credit clause to custody decrees, the decision clearly
nullified any practical effect the clause might have had:
So far as the Full Faith and Credit Clause is concerned, what Florida could do
in modifying the decree, New York may do. . . . [I]t is clear that the State of
the forum has at least as much leeway to disregard the judgment, to qualify it,
or to depart from it as does the State where it was rendered.1
7
This decision also nullified the effect of any voluntary recognition of
custody decrees of sister states. Since today the states permit the
modification of their custody decrees by their own courts, other states
may in one breath state that they recognize the prior decree and, at the
same time, give custody to another person, usually on a perfunctory
finding of changed circumstances. The Halvey doctrine, since
reaffirmed," and the judicial assumption that children need custody
decrees which may be freely reopened gave much encouragement to
persons bent on retrieving a child lost in the first round of a custody
battle. 9
15. Address by Justice Fairchild of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, Conference of Chief
Justices, Mim. 8 (August, 1961). See also Foster & Freed, Children and the Lail-, 2 FA.I. L.Q.
40,49 (1968).
16. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
17. Id. at 614,615.
18. Ford v. Ford;-371 U.S. 187 (1962); Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958).
19. The Supreme Court decisions referred to have been interpreted as indications that the
policy of protecting the welfare of the child may outweigh the national policy of full faith and
credit. See Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments. 49 COLUM. L.
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That children might perhaps need the benefits of full faith and
credit more than ordinary litigants to assure the stability of custody
arrangements and the continuity of family attachments, did not occur
to most of the Justices at the time of Halve). Indeed, only recently have
improved communications between law and behavioral sciences led
lawyers to question such traditionally ingrained notions as the false
premise that children need freely changeable custody arrangements.
Only Justice Rutledge, in his concurring opinion, predicted some of the
unfortunate consequences of Halve)' which have become common
occurrences in our times:
The result seems unfortunate in that, apparently, it may make possible a
continuing round of litigation over custody, perhaps also of abduction, between
alienated parents. That consequence hardly can be thought conducive to the child's
welfare ....
T . . iT]he effect of the decision may be to set up an unseemly litigous
.competition between the states and their respective courts as well as between
parents. Sometime, somehow, there should be an end to litigation in such
matters3'
Another off-shoot of the preference for the non-finality of custody
decrees is the Supreme Court's decision in May v. Anderson,21 which
suggests that any person who is not personally served in the state or
who is otherwise technically not under the personal jurisdiction of the
court is not bound by its custody decree. This case clearly demonstrates
that the modification of a custody decree-in this instance at the behest
of one of the contenders who managed to stay out of the first
adjudicating state-will often be in the interest of a feuding litigant, but
has little to do with the interest of the child. Justice Jackson, in his
REV. 153, 160, 173-74, 177-78 (1949). See also Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity
Decrees, 42 IOWA L. REV. 183, 195-96 (1957); Note, Child Custodyr Decrees -/-nterstate
Recognition. 49 IOWA L. REV. 1178, 1200 (1964). The illustration given by Reese and Johnson
concerning a mother who became a drug-addict suggests that they had in mind the exercise of a
state's power of parens patriae to protect a child from neglect or mistreatment rather than the
modification of a custody judgment of another state. Reese & Johnson, supra at 173-74. The
parens patriae power exists with respect to all children, whether they live under the statutory
custody of their natural parents or with a custodian appointed by a court. When that power is
exercised within its proper limits (see Justice Cardozo in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E.
624 (1925)), it is a state emergency measure and not the disregard of a judgment rendered
elsewhere. For a criticism of the use made of the child custody decisions of the Supreme Court
to support the limitation on full faith and credit contained in section 103 of the proposed
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, see Comment, Full Faith and Credit to Judgmients:
Law and Reason Versus the Restatenment Second, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 282 (1966).
20. New York exrel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619-20 (1947).
21. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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dissent, forecast the dangers of an approach which "'seems to reduce
the law of custody to a rule of seize-and-run. '2 2 He warned:
The convenience of a leave-taking parent is placed above the welfare of the
child, but neither party is greatly aided in obtaining a decision. The Wisconsin
courts cannot bind the mother, and the Ohio courts cannot bind the father. A state
of the law such as this, where possession apparently is not merely nine points of
the law but all of them and self-help the ultimate authority, has little to commend
it in legal logic or as a principle of order in a federal system.
l ..[Hjere the Court requires personal service upon a spouse who decamps
before the State of good-faith domicile can make provision for custody ...
Wisconsin had a far more real concern with the transactions here litigated than
have many of the divorce-mill forums ....
... Personal jurisdiction of all parties to be affected by a proceeding is
highly desirable, to make certain that they have had valid notice and opportunity
to be heard. But the assumption that it overrides all other considerations and in
its absence a state is constitutionally impotent to resolve questions of custody flies
in the face of our own cases.?
There is, however, another reason for the Supreme Court's
unwillingness to apply the full faith and credit clause in custody cases.
Justice Frankfurter suggested in his dissenting opinion in Kovacs that:
This case vividly illustrates the evil of requiring one court, which may be
peculiarly well-situated for making the delicate determination of what is in the
child's best interests, to defer to a prior foreign decree, which may well be the
result of a superficial or abstract judgment on what the child's welfare
requires. . . .The minimum nexus between court and child that must exist before
the court's award of the child's custody should carry any authority is that the
court should have been in a position adequately to inform itself regarding the
needs and desires of the child, of what is in the child's best interests3 4
Thus, without directly addressing the question of state court
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court left the nagging doubt that perhaps the
prior custody decree was not as informed and as trustworthy a
judgment as it should have been. NaturalLy, the Court cannot be
expected to supervise the standards of state custody procedures through
a selective application of the full faith and credit clause similar to its
role in supervising state criminal cases! ' But the practical effect of the
Court's reluctance to take any stand on full faith and credit and
jurisdiction has been to withhold all federal controls from interstate
custody law.
22. Id. at 542. See also text accompanying notes 94-108 infra.
23. Id. at 539-41. On the effects of the Hal. and May line of cases, see also G.
STUMBERG. PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 325-26 (3d ed. 1963).
24. Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 613-14 (1958).
25. Note, Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Child Custodr Decrees?, 73 YALE L.J.
134, 139-41 (1963).
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The void left by the Supreme Court in declining to rule on state
court jurisdiction was filled largely by the decision of the Supreme
Court of California in Sampsell v. Superior Court,6 which gained
wide-spread acceptance and was incorporated into the proposed second
version of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws.!7 Samipsell adopted a
multiple jurisdiction test under which the child's domicile, the child's
presence in the state, or personal jurisdiction over the claimants, are
alternate bases for jurisdiction; and jurisdiction may be concurrent in
several states. Sam psell was decided in 1948, one year after Halvey,
and was strongly influenced by that case. Justice Traynor, speaking for
the majority in Sampsell, pointed out that the really burning question
of interstate custody law was not the question of jurisdiction but the
question of whether a custody decree has binding force in another state.
Noting that the Halvey holding permits other states to modify a
California custody decree, Justice Traynor concluded:
Since the courts of this state do not finally and conclusively determine
custody in a divorce proceeding, there is no reason to attempt to arrive at some
basis for jurisdiction that should be accepted as final and conclusive in all statesP
In other words, if, according to the United States Supreme Court,
other states may freely modify a custody decree, it becomes rather
unimportant to determine which state should take jurisdiction in the
first place. Without the full faith and credit clause to rely on, and with
nothing to stop out-of-state custody changes, there may be no point in
having rules of jurisdiction at all.29
But Justice Traynor in Samnpsell had no intention of letting down
all the bars to indiscriminate assumption of jurisdiction by any state,
no matter how slight the connection with the child and family. He
spoke of the need "to avoid interminable and vexatious litigation,"
counseled confidence in the custody decisions of other states, and
suggested the use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens to avoid
jurisdictional conflicts30
26. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONI-LICT OI- LAWS § 79 (Proposed Official Draft, Part
1, 1967).
28. 32 Cal. 2d 763. 780, 197 P.2d 739, 750 (1948).
29. In fact, this seems to be the situation today: "Child custody decisions afford no better
than a quicksand foundation for analysis of jurisdiction. . . .Rules purporting to define judicial
jurisdiction and to establish finality for prior decisions fade into thin air when they are
contradicted by facts affecting the child's welfare." R. LuILAR. AkERICAN CONI.LICTS LAU 585
(1968). See also H. CLARK. supra note 10. at 320.
30. 32 Cal. 2d 763, 779-80, 197 P.2d 739. 750 (1948).
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Justice Traynor referred to an influential article by Professor Dale
Stansbury, written in 1944, which took a very optimistic view of the
problem:
Respect for other courts' judgments is a judicial habit which would scarcely be
broken by acknowledging a multiple jurisdiction and removing the compulsion of
full faith and credit in this one small field. Indeed it is not unreasonable to imagine
that that respect would be increased and made more wholesome by placing it on
a frankly discretionary basis . . .
These high hopes have not been realized. The unprecedented movement
of the population during and after World War II and the high rates
of family breakups and other social changes of the 1950's and 1960's
greatly accentuated the problem. The legal vacuum created by the
Halve"v doctrine, combined with the social transformations of recent
times, have created a situation in which self-help and the "rule of seize
and run" flourish, as Justice Jackson had predicted."
With the federal system not operating effectively in an area which
is vital for the mental and physical health of growing generations, the
states have done their best to ameliorate the situation. One helpful
device has been the use of the "clean hands doctrine" to bar from court
any child abductor or other violator of a custody decree of another
state.33 Of course, the doctrine cannot be applied when this punitive
measure against a parent may work to the detriment of the child.-4
Also, the doctrine may often be circumvented by asking for the
modification of a custody decree in another state during a period when
the child is legally under the control of the petitioner, usually during a
visit permitted by the decree 5 Some courts have declined jurisdiction
to avoid clashes with the courts of other states.:-6 Other courts have
31. Stansbury, Custodr" and Maintenance Law Across State Lines. 10 LAW & CONTIEMP.
PROB. 819, 83"1 (1944).
32. 345 U.S. 528, 542 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
33. After Professor Ehrenzweig discovered that courts in some states consistently turned
away violators of out-of-state custody decrees, he provided the theoretical explanation and the
name of the doctrine and strengthened it in turn through his writings. See Ehrenzweig, Interstate
Recognition 0J Custodi Decrees, 51 MICH. L. Ri-v. 345 (1953), reprinted in revised jbrm in
SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT OF LAWs 822 (M. Culp ed. 1956).
34. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966); Smith
v. Smith, 135 Cal. App. 2d 100, 286 P.2d 1009 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
35. See, e.g.. Brocker v. Brocker, 429 Pa. 513, 241 A.2d 336 (1968), involving a father who
applied to a court of another state for custody of his children within the authorized period of
visitation. See Comment, Conflicting Custodr Decrees: In Whose Best Interest?. 7 DUQUESNi. L.
REv. 262 (1969).
36. See, e.g.. Brazy v. Brazy, 5 Wis. 2d 352, 92 N.W.2d 738 (1959); State e- rel. Kern v.
Kern, 17 Wis. 2d 268, 116 N.W.2d 337 (1962).
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attempted to work out their own rules of jurisdiction."7 But the problem
has become too big to be handled by each of the 50 states
independently.
There are three possible alternative courses of action to remedy the
situation: First, there could be congressional legislation under the
authorization of the full faith and credit clause;38 second, the United
States Supreme Court could become active in this area and hammer
out, case by case, a set of rules providing for selective recognition of
custody decisions of other states based on reasonable standards for
jurisdiction and restricting modifications; 3 and third, the states can
impose rules on themselves by uniform legislation. Since there is little
likelihood that any action will be taken by Congress or the Supreme
Court within the near future, the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws have prepared a law which can remedy the harm done to children
who are caught in the present jungle of the conflict of laws.
II. THE UNIFORM ACT
A. The Preparatory Work
In a letter received by the National Conference of Commissioners
a number of years ago, the father of a young boy bitterly complained
that he had been unable, through proper procedures of the law, to see
his son, who, under a divorce decree, was to spend two months of the
summer with him. He had been advised by his former wife that any
attempt to enforce his visitation rights in the state in which she now
lived would be met by her departure from that state, "and so on from
court to court and state to state. ' 40 A survey conducted by the
National Conference convinced the Commissioners that the "rule of
seize and run" is indeed rampant throughout the country and operates
beyond the borders of the United States; that many courts freely alter
custody decisions made out-of-state; that conflicting custody decrees in
two states are no rarity; and that innumerable children are without
37. See, e.g., Sharpe v. Sharpe, 77 Il1. App. 2d 295, 222 N.E.2d 340 (1966) ("single court"
theory of jurisdiction chosen over a "home-court" theory).
38. This was Professor B. Currie's preference. See Currie. Full Faith and Credit, C'hheJ)
to Judgments: A Role jr Congress. 1964 Sup. CT. R iv. 89, 115-18.
39. This is suggested in Comment, supra note 35, at 274-75. See also Note, supra note 25,
at 148-50, proposing that the Supreme Court, without detailed supervision of state custody
litigation, extend the protection of full faith and credit to custody decrees rendered in the state
of permanent residence or another state with a substantial interest in the child.
40. Letter by William Clemmons to Committee on State Legislation. Council of State
Governments, July 30, 1957.
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secure and permanent homes because of severe shortcomings in
interstate custody law. The need for uniform legislation to correct the
law appeared to be patent and urgent.
The Family Law Section of the American Bar Association also
studied the matter under the energetic chairmanship of its Committee
on Child Custody, Mr. Harry Fain. That Committee was aided by
Professor Leonard Ratner, who surveyed the field and pointed the way
in his monumental study entitled "Child Custody in a Federal
System"'" and in a draft of a proposed uniform law.42 Other scholars,
encouraged by the prospect of a legislative solution, expressed their
views and suggestions. When the National Conference of
Commissioners in 1965 officially authorized the drafting of a uniform
law, it was able to draw on the groundwork laid by Professor Ratner
and on a considerable amount of other expert opinion. Professor Albert
Ehrenzweig stressed the interdependence of the courts in custody
matters and the need to concentrate the proceedings in one court.
43
Professor Henry Foster suggested that payment of travel expenses be
imposed to insure the appearance of other parties and strongly
advocated severe restrictions on modifications of out-of-state custody
decrees.44 Professor David Engdahl prepared several helpful
memoranda on the legal points involved and wrote a preliminary
draft." Professor John Bradway suggested that it is less essential to
determine with precision which state has jurisdiction than to insure that
the courts involved cooperate fully in fact-gathering and for other
purposes." While there were differences of opinion, some of them due
to the unsettled state of legal theory, practically all the writers desired
legislation which would give a strong measure of.interstate finality to
custody litigation, curb child abductions and other self-help measures,
and insure interstate judicial cooperation.
The Commissioner's Special Committee on Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act made use of many of the ideas of the experts and did
extensive research of its own. Several tentative drafts were prepared
41. 62 MICH. L. REv. 795 (1964).
42. Ratner, Legislative Resolution oJ the Interstate Child Custodr Problem: A Reply to
ProJf'ssor Currieanda Proposed Uniform Act. 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 183, 196 (1965).
43. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 2.
44. Foster, Mini. memorandum, supra note 12.
45. See D. Engdahl, Memorandum. September 13. 1965 (unpublished memorandum for the
Legislative Research Center of the University of Michigan Law School).
46. J Bradway. Memorandum, August 18, 1965 (unpublished). Professor Bradway would
want us to move from "'competitive jurisdiction isolation" to "interstate judicial cooperation" in
custody cases.
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under the chairmanship of Professor William Brockelbank and later
under the chairmanship of Dean John Wade. Judge Eugene Burdick of
North Dakota, under whose overall jurisdiction the Special Committee
operated, actively participated in the drafting effort. Consultations
were had with many of these scholars, and particularly with Professor
Robert Levy to coordinate the work on this uniform law with his work
on uniform marriage and divorce legislation. 7 Professor Elliott
Cheatham took an active interest in the progress of the Uniform Act
and contributed section 23 on International Application.
B. Basic Provisions
The basic scheme of the Act is simple. First, one court in the
country assumes full responsibility for custody of a particular child.
Second, for this purpose a court is selected which has access to as much
relevant information about the child and family in the state as possible.
Third, other essential evidence, which is inevitably out-of-state in the
case of an interstate child, is channelled into the first court which might
be called the "custody court." Fourth, other states abide by the
decision of the custody court and enforce it in their territory, if
necessary. Fift-h, adjustments in visitation and other ancillary
provisions of the decree, and custody changes, if any, are as a rule
made by the original custody court. Sixth, if the child and his family
no longer have appreciable ties with the state of the original court, a
new custody court is selected to take the place of the original one for
purposes of adjustments and modifications, and pertinent information
is channelled from the prior to the subsequent custody court.
This scheme is carried out by the major provisions of the Act.
Section 3 provides that jurisdiction in custody cases is normally limited
to the courts of the state which is the child's home state or in which
there are other strong contacts with the child and his family. Sections
6 and 7 assure that any possible jurisdictional conflict between the
courts of several states are resolved by the priority-in-time or the
inconvenient forum principle, aided by direct interstate judicial
communications. Sections 19-22 instruct courts to assist each other in
gathering out-of-state evidence by holding hearings on behalf of a
custody court in another state, by forwarding court records, and in
other ways. Sections 13 and 15 provide that a custody decree rendered
in accordance with the jurisdictional standards of the Act be accorded
recognition and direct enforcement in any other state. Under section
47. See note 12 supra.
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14 the power to modify a custody decree remains exclusively in the
court which made the prior decree so long as that court satisfies the
jurisdictional requirements of the Act.
Section 8 codifies the "clean hands" doctrine as applied to
custody proceedings; section 10 assures that all persons claiming
custody of the same child are joined in one proceeding; section 12
specifies that parties given reasonable notice and opportunity to be
heard are bound by a custody decree; and sections 11, 19(b) and 20(b)
encourage the appearance in court of all parties and the child, whether
in or out of the state, through payment of travel expenses when
necessary.
Every section of the Act is to be applied in the light of its basic
purposes, as expressed in section 1, to discourage continuing
controversies over child custody in the interest of stability of home
environment for the child, to deter child abductions and similar
practices employed to obtain custody awards, and to promote mutual
interstate judicial assistance in custody cases.
C. Scope of the Act
The Uniform Act deals almost exclusively with the interstate
aspects of custody proceedings. It does not concern itself with the
manner in which the judge arrives at the custody judgment, the use of
trained personnel to make custody investigations or social studies, or
the provision of independent legal representation for the child.48 There
is, however, a great deal of interdependence between the latter intra-
state aspects and the interstite custody law since the Act here under
discussion requires high standards of custody procedures under local
law in order to be completely successful. Undoubtedly the Uniform Act
itself will stimulate better informed and more carefully considered
custody determinations, not only because it stresses the need for
bringing in out-of-state evidence, but also because the initial decision,
which cannot ordinarily be reopened in another state, takes on much
greater significance than before. Furthermore, the American Bar
Association is actively concerned about this area of the law,49 and the
48. On matters concerning intra-state custody law, see generally H. CLARK, supra note 10,
at 572-601; Fain, Custody of Children, I CALIF. FAMILY LAWYER 539 (1961); Foster & Freed,
Child Custody (pts. I & 2), 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 423, 615 (1964); Hansen, Three Dimensions of
Divorce, 50 MARQ. L. REV. I, 8-12 (1966).
49. See A.B.A. Model Statute, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECTION OF FAMILY LAW 38
(1963); Leavell, Custody Disputes and the Proposed ModelAct, 2 GA. L. REV. 162 (1968).
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Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are preparing legislation to
improve intra-state custody law and procedure as part of their current
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Project.50
D. Interstate Jurisdiction
1. Relationship to Recognition.-One of the most important
functions of interstate rules of custody jurisdiction is to serve as criteria
for the recognition of custody decrees by other states. As Justice
Traynor intimated in Sanipsell, as long as custody decisions have no
binding force in other states and are freely modifiable by them, it is
not essential to have clearly circumscribed rules of jurisdiction. But
once it has become clear that a halt to unending custody litigation can
be achieved only by interstate recognition of decrees rendered
elsewhere, jurisdictional rules assume an elevated importance.
Standards of jurisdiction are the only practicable means at our disposal
to distinguish decrees that deserve recognition by other states from
those that do not.5'
Custody decrees vary a great deal in quality. There are perfunctory
decrees made in migratory divorce cases, and there are highly
sophisticated custody decisions arrived at with all the aid a family
court procedure can supply." There are decrees which are equitable and
fair to all parties and there are others which are partial to the local
resident. There are punitive decrees, which change custody to discipline
a parent, 53 and there are others, which will not let a parent's misdeed
influence the court's concern for the child. It is, however, neither
practically possible nor desirable from the standpoint of stability for
the child to single out for recognition only those custody decrees that
are wise, fair, and fully cognizant of all the factors that should enter
into a custody decision. Thus, the Uniform Act provides some means
short of withholding recognition to cope with the problems of partial and
of punitive decrees. 4 The fact of recognition itself, along with restriction
on modifications in section 14, have the retroeffect of strengthening the
care used and the responsibility felt by the original judge who knows
that his custody order may determine the entire course of the life of
the child before him.
50. See R.LEvY. supra note 12, at 222-46.
51. See Note, supra note 25, at 148-50.
52. Foster & Freed, supra note 48, at 615-22; Hansen, supra note 48.
53. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 33, at 370. in SELLCTE) RI:ADI NGS ON CON IACT oi LAWS
54. See text accompanying notes 123-130 & 136 infra.
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The only distinction that commends itself as a criterion for the
recognition of out-of-state custody judgments is that between
informed-or potentially informed-custody decisions and custody
decisions based on inadequate information. The court most likely to
decide correctly is the court having maximum access to the relevant
evidence.55 It follows thht custody decisions rendered in states in which
as much as possible of the essential information about the child and
his potential custodians is available will be considered trustworthy
enough to command respect and recognitiop in other states..
5 6
Jurisdictional rules that place jurisdiction where most of the facts are
found are therefore the best method we can devise to determine
interstate recognizability.
2. The Bases of Jurisdiction. (a) General considerations.-In
attempting to devise workable jurisdictional rules, the Commissioners
were conscious that they must do so with an eye to recognition of the
decree and that the cardinal rule here, as elsewhere in custody law, is
that the interest of the child should govern the choices to be made. As
a general proposition the state in which there is the best opportunity
to investigate the facts is most qualified to take jurisdiction. The
Commissioners' research convinced them, however, that there is no
perfect solution to this problem in the sense of laying down absolutely
certain and exclusive rules of jurisdiction. They found that it is no
accident that courts and legal writers have searched for and debated
the answer to this question for decades.17 Having determined that the
state should handle the case that. is closest to the relevant facts, we have
only begun the search for an dnswer. We must next know which facts
are relevant and which of several possible states harbors more relevant
evidence than the others.
Suppose a married couple lives in state A for several years, then
leaves their children in state B with friends while they consider
obtaining a divorce. The parents eventually separate and the wife takes
a job in state C while the husband is transferred to another city in state
C. By the time the custody dispute between father and mother is taken
to court, both parents have been settled in their new communities for
six months and the children have lived with the friends in state B for
a year and will remain there until the end of the proceedings. The
friends do not claim custody.
55. Ratner, supra note 41, at 809; Stumberg, supra note 14, at 56.
56. See Stumberg, supra note 14, at 61-62.
57. Compare RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 (1934), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (Proposed Official Draft 1967).
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A court in state A, the matrimonial home, would undoubtedly find
witnesses who could give information about the life of the parents and
children while they lived there and the relationship of each parent to
the children. This is relevant evidence because the facts of the past shed
some light on the kind of home either one of the parents could give to
the child in the future. There is, however, not a shred of evidence in
state A about the present situation, and none of the custody claimants
are in the state. It would therefore be concluded that state A, although
it possesses relevant evidence, is not in the best position to investigate
the facts.
State B where the children now live, has information on the
present condition of the children and on the care they are receiving
from the-pa.rents' friends. However, since the friends are not the
children's potential custodians, there is little evidence of great relevance
in the state. There are no facts in the state about the kind of care the
children will receive from either one of their potential custodians,
except for any light the children 'themselves can shed on that question
and possibly some testimony by the friends.
This leaves state C where both contestants live. While they have
not been settled in the state for more than six months, their own
availability as witnesses, combined with testimony of persons in the
state who have come to know them, should reveal important facts
about their respective abilities to provide an adequate home for the
children. It would probably be concluded that a court in this state has
more access to the relevant evidence than the other two.
If the facts were slightly different in that husband and wife each
settled in different states, states C and D respectively, it would be
impossible to say which of these two states has the better opportunity
to investigate the facts. Of course, while there may be sufficient
evidence in one of the states to permit a court to assume jurisdiction,
it is the nature of an interstate custody case that the judge needs
information from another state to complete the picture, and often he
needs these facts as much as the information he finds in his own state'8
Consider another illustration: suppose the matrimonial home is in
state A, and the husband remains there. The wife and children with the
consent of the husband move to state B, which is the wife's former
home state and where her parents live. They have been in state B for
three months when court proceedings are prepared. Relevant facts
about the children's present condition and care are in state B along
5
58. See text accompanying notes 135-36 infra.
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with some of the facts about the qualifications of one of the potential
custodians. State A has the information concerning the past
relationship between each parent and the children as well as most of
the facts about the other potential custodian. Here again, it will be
difficult to decide which state has more of the relevant evidence.
These two illustrations clarify what facts are most relevant in
making a custody decision and what considerations govern the search
for the most appropriate state to assume jurisdiction. Although the
child is the center of attention in a custody proceeding, the main
inquiry is directed toward two or more adults and toward making a
prediction for the future concerning the superior ability of one of them
to surround the child with the necessary security, affection, and all
other needs of a growing child. As Professor Rheinstein pointed out,
" a determination of the child's best interests [cannot] be made without
an inquiry into the comparative merits of the parties. '59 That inquiry,
focused on the parents' potential future relationship with the child, is
in fact the main object of the proceedings. The child himself may
supply some evidence in that regard, although it is difficult for the
judge to gain more than a superficial impression from a brief interview
with him, unless an older child is involved who might express a
preference. Usually, the most significant evidence will have to come
from the parents themselves, from other persons who might be
entrusted with the care of the child, and from those who can testify
about the competence of these persons as custodians.
The child's residence or presence in one of the states in question
has some bearing, but not a decisive one, on the choice of the state that
is to take jurisdiction. If, for example, the child lives with relatives in
state B for a year while the father is in Vietnam and the mother is in
state A, the matrimonial home, where she is slowly recuperating from
an operation, and the relatives refuse to relinquish the child after the
father's return and the mother's recovery, the fact that state B is
presently the child's residence does not exclude jurisdiction of state A,
which might in fact be the more appropriate forum.
While it is difficult in many cases to determine with certainty
which of several states has maximum access to the relevant evidence,
those factors which are insufficient to provide jurisdiction can be stated
with more precision. The fact alone that the child is physically present
in the state does not give the court enough local information about his
possible future custodians to permit it to assume jurisdiction. The same
59. Rheinstein, Jurisdiction in Matters of Child Custody, 26 CONN. B.J. 48, 64 (1952).
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is true if the child and one of the contestants are physically present in
the state for some temporary purpose, like the institution of custody
proceedings after the child has been legally or illegally removed from
another state, or for purposes of migratory divorce."0 The child, or
child and adult, do not have sufficient ties to the community in these
situations to justify jurisdiction to decide custody. Naturally, if the
child is stranded in the state or is being endangered by the adult with
whom he is staying, a court, usually a juvenile court, would assume
jurisdiction to take necessary emergency measures, including removal
of the child from the custody of the person involved.6
Despite these difficulties, the search by the Commissioners for
some definite jurisdictional rule did end in partial success. They
attempted to find a substitute criterion for the child's "domicile"
which would better pinpoint the state with which the child has a rather
permanent connection.12 They considered the state "where the child
habitually lives,' ' 3 his "permanent abode,"' 4 "actual residence"6" or
"permanent residence," 6 and the "established home.""7
Professor Ratner's concept of the "established home" has the
great advantage that it not only avoids the ambiguities of "domicile"
and "residence,"6 but also gives an exact definition of the term itself.
"Established home" is defined as "the last place where the child has
lived with a parent [or a person acting as parent] for a sufficient time
to become integrated into the community."6 That period of time is
fixed at a minimum of six months on the reasonable assumption of fact
60. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 2, at 6, 10. See also text accompanying notes 82-85 inJra.
61. See text accompanying notes 87-91 infra.
62. There is general agreement today that the child's domicile as an exclusive test ror
custody jurisidiction is unsatisfactory since "domicile" is a technical concept which relates back
to the father's (or the mother's) domicile and may be located in a state where the child does not
actually live or where perhaps he has never been. See, e.g., EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT 01- LAWS
281-82 (1962); Stansbury, supra note 31, at 820-22, 827; Stumberg, supra note 14, at 62. The
domicile criterion has, however, been retained by the second Restatement as an alternate basis
for custody jurisidiction. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS. supra note 57. § 79.
Yet the reasons advanced against the child's domicile as an exclusive criterion would seem to be
equally applicable when domicile of father or mother is relied upon under a non-exclusive test.
63. G. STUIBERO. supra note 23, at 323.
64. Ehrenzweig, supra note 2, at 6.
65. Stansbury, supra note 3 1, at 823. Cf. Rheinstein, supra note 59, at 64.
66. Note, supra note 25, at 148-50.
67. Ratner, supra note 41, at 815.
68. See Rheinstein, supra note 59, at 60-63; Reese & Green, That Elusive Word.
"Residence-, 6 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1953).
69. Ratner, supra note 41, at 815.
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that "[m]ost American children are integrated into an American
community after living there six months.1
70
Professor Ratner discovered, however, that the "established
home" criterion does not suffice as an exclusive rule of jurisdiction
because it does not cover all of the varied factual situations that
commonly arise. For example, some children have not lived anywhere
long enough to have an established home, or parents and children have
left the established home before separation and have not returned, or
none of the parties reside in the state of the established home at the
outset of the proceedings.71 Accordingly, it was necessary to devise a
number of subsidiary rules of exclusive jurisdiction to cover these
situations, supplemented with d~finitions of "transient abode," "non-
transient abode," "authorized residence," and so forth.
71
The Commissioners incorporated Professor Ratner's "estab-
lished home" idea, in modified form, into the Uniform Act as
a nonexclusive "home state" concept,, but did not follow him all the
way along his path of subsidiary rules, although many of his other
suggestions found their way into the Act.
The "home state" rule was adopted in order to have one definite
and certain criterion, a rule of thumb which is easy to apply. It was
combined with a more flexible but not wide-open test, based on strong
contacts of the child and family with the state.
(b) Home state.-Section 3 of the Act gives custody jurisdiction
to the child's "home state," the state in which the child lived for at
least six consecutive months with a parent or person acting as parent
immediately before the custody proceedings.7 3 Thus, if the child lived
in a state for six months with his mother or a foster parent who claims
custody immediately before the case goes to court, that state
automatically has jurisdiction without the need for any further inquiry.
If the child is removed from the home state or is retained elsewhere
and not returned, home state jurisdiction is extended by section
3(a)(l)(ii) for an additional six months to give the stay-at-home parent
or custodian the opportunity to sue in his own state and under the
home state rule. This extension protects a parent whose child" has been
abducted, for example, by relieving him of the necessity of following
70. Id. at 818.
71. Id. at 818-19.
72. Id.; Ratner, supra note 42, at 185-86, 198-200.
73. See UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 3(a)(1). See id. § 2(5) for further
details of the definition of "home state;" and see id. § 2(9) for a definition of "person acting
as parent."
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the abductor and the child to another state or to several states in
succession to reclaim the child in court. But the six-month extension
is not limited to cases, of wrongful or unauthorized removal or
retention. It applies also if a child is away at school 4 or if he has run
away from home to another state. Despite some authority to the
contrary, 75 it is today generally agreed that physical presence of the
child in the state is not a prerequisite for custody jurisdiction." In order
to make this entirely clear, section 3(c) spells this out expressly.
(c) Strong contacts.-If the family has moved frequently and
there is no state in which the child has lived for six months just prior
to suit, jurisdiction is determined under a "strong contacts" test
contained in section 3(a)(2). The same is true if the child has been
absent from his home state for less than six months, but his parent or
other custodian has also moved away; or if the child's absence, for
instance in a boarding school, has been for longer than six months.
This test requires that "the child . . . and at least one contestant,
have a significant connection with this State," and that "there is
available in this State substantial evidence concerning the child's
present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships." The test is expressly limited by the rule of section 3(b)
that "physical presence in this State of the child, or of the child and
one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction
Jurisdiction under this test may be concurrent with jurisdiction
under the "home state" rule if the ties of the family are equal or
stronger with another state. Jurisdictional conflict is avoided by the
priority-in-time or inconvenient forum rules, which will be discussed
later in this article 7  For example, if the original matrimonial home
was state A, where husband, wife, and children lived for a number of
years before they moved to state B, where they lived for six months
74. If he is in school away from home for longer than six months, jurisdiction must be
based on the "strong contacts" rule of the UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
§ 3(a)(2).
75. Justice Frankfurter's remark in Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 614 (1958) that "the
very least that should be expected . . . is that the child be physically within the jurisdiction" has
had some influence. However, when read in its context, it is clear that all the Justice meant to
say was that the custody court should be in a position to make a thorough investigation of the
facts. See Ratner, supra note 42, at 190-93.
76. See Justice Traynor in Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 781, 197 P.2d 739,
751 (1948); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 57, § 79. A contrary rule
would encourage child abductions.
77. UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT §§ 6, 7; text accompanying note 92
infra.
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before they separated, and the wife returned to state A with the
children, state B is the "home state" and the left-behind husband can
sue there if he wishes. There are also strong contacts with state A which
give that state concurrent jurisdiction if it is chosen as the forum state.
Another example of possible alternative jurisdiction is presented
by the facts of the well-known case of Painter v. Bannister.78 Mark
Painter lived in California with his parents when his mother and
younger sister were killed in an accident in December, 1962. The boy
remained with his father until July, 1963 when the father asked the
Bannisters, the maternal grandparents, to take care of him temporarily
since other arrangements had proved unsatisfactory. The Bannisters
took Mark, then age five, to their farm home in Iowa. His father
remarried in November, 1964, and when he asked the grandparents for
the return of his son, they refused to let the boy leave. It is clear that
the Iowa court had jurisdiction under the "home" state" rule, since
Mark had lived there continuously with his grandparents who acted as
parents79 for some fifteen months. The court found as a fact, however,
that Mr. Painter did not permanently relinquish custody, and intended
a mere temporary arrangement. It is clear that a California court could
not have taken jurisdiction under the "home state" test extension since
Mark had departed from California more than six months before suit.
However, the child and father had a strong connection with California
where they both had lived all their lives until the boy went to Iowa.
There was available in California substantial evidence about Mr.
Painter, about his new wife, their home, and the future manner in
which they would care for the boy if custody should be awarded to the
father. Since the temporary relinquishment of the child affects the
strength of the ties which remained with California, it seems that
California would have had concurrent jurisdiction if the case had come
up under the Uniform Act."
(d) Mere presence.-The basic notion underlying the Act-that
jurisdiction be limited to those states which have maximuhi access to
the relevant facts-implicitly excludes jurisdiction when the child and
78. 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966). No jurisdictional
question was involved in the case itself.
79. To be a "person acting as parent" under the definition of section 2(9), a grandparent
must have physical custody of the child and claim a right to legal custody.
80. Under the provisions of sections 12, 13, and 15 of the Act, a custody decree obtained
in California can be enforced in Iowa like an Iowa decree. See text at note I I I infra. Custody of
Mark Painter originally awarded to his grandparents in the Iowa case, has since been given to
his father by a California court. See In re Painter, No. 22077 (Super. Ct. Santa Cruz Co., Calif.
1968) (unpublished).
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
custody claimant are merely physically present without any durable ties
with the state. Although this principle is clear from the "home state"
and "strong contacts" rules, it is spelled out expressly in section 3(b)
of the Act. Only if this distinction is strictly made can the jurisdictional
standards of the Act be justified as criteria for the recognition of
custody decrees by other states.
If the presence of the child and a contestant in the state is only
temporary, such as a visit with relatives, business meetings, or the
institution of the custody proceeding itself, a court in that state does
not have jurisdiction to determine custody.8' For example, if the child
is in state B on a three-month visit under a custody decree of state A,
state B does not have jurisdiction. Similarly, presence in the state for
the purpose of migratory divorce requiring "domicile" of only short
duration, does not confer custody jurisdiction:
Although custody proceedings are usually brought as an incident to a suit for
divorce, jurisdiction to make the award involves considerations which are quite
different from those involved in jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage.2
Submission by the other parent to the jurisdiction of a migratory
divorce court does not change the situation. Since mere technical
personal jurisdiction does not add relevant new evidence, ' consent
cannot confer a basis for interstate jurisdiction which does not
otherwise exist:
The trial court unquestionably had jurisdiction over the parties, for by
answering plaintiff's complaint on the merits defendant waived any claim of lack
of jurisdiction over her . . . . This appearance, however, did not confer
jurisdiction on the court over the subject matter of the action, for such jurisdiction
may not be waived by a party or conferred on the court by consent."
Under the "strong contacts" clause, jurisdiction exists only if it is in
the child's interest for the court to assume jurisdiction, and the child's
interest does not necessarily coincide with the interest or convenience
81. Compare Professor Ratner's legislative proposal which uses a three-month test. A
person who is living in the state "while on a trip or on a visit that has not lasted more than
three months" would be only temporarily present. See Ratner, supra note 42. at 198.
82. Stumberg, supra note 14, at 53. See also H. CLARK. supra note 10. at 578: Ehrcnzweig.
supra note 2. at 6, 10. Professor Rheinstein distinguishes between "mere physical presence" and
"residence" of a child in the state of divorce. Mere presence of the child with one of the parties
in a state of migratory divorce would not be sufficient for custody jurisdiction in his view. See
Rheinstein, supra note 59, at 62-65.
83. Usually the defendant spouse remains in the home state and merely files an answer
through an attorney. C(. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
84. Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 773. 197 P.2d 739, 746 (1948). When
referring here to jurisdiction over subject matter, Justice Traynor is dealing with interstate custody
jurisdiction in a divorce case.
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of his feuding relatives. s Of course, if the other parent actually travels
to the state of migratory divorce (and consequently more than one
contestant and the child are present in the state), and there is an
opportunity for a full hearing on custody, this could satisfy the
jurisdictional requirements of the Act.
Certainly, custody jurisdiction will be present in the great majority
of divorce cases. Only when there is divorce migration of the
evasionary type, will there be a question with respect to custody
jurisdiction. We are, however, already used to "divisible divorce" in
this type of case, and persons who can afford this type of divorce
usually have the financial resources for a custody proceeding in the
child's home state or another state which has strong contacts with the
child and family. In any event, with the trend toward liberalization of
divorce grounds in many states, there may be fewer evasionary divorce
migrations. As far as the child himself is concerned, his main interest
is in an early settlement of the custody question in a court which can
sufficiently investigate the facts so that the decree, in many cases once
made, can remain unchangedV6
(e) Emergency jurisdiction.-It is sometimes stated without
qualification that the state in which a child is physically present has
jurisdiction to determine his custody.87 But if one looks closer, one
finds invariably that the power of a state to take measures concerning
the custody of A child found within its borders derives from "the
protection that is due to the incompetent or helpless,"' 8 or from the
responsibility in an emergency to act as parens patriae.5 As Justice
85. "IT]he best interests or the child might not be dependent on whether the court 'has
personal jurisdiction over both parents." Comment, The Puzzle of Jurisdiction in Child Custody'
Actions, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 542 (1966). The fact that personal jurisdiction over both
spouses may for all practical purposes have become a jurisdictional basis for divorce has no
bearing on child custody jurisdiction which involves a third person whose interests at the time or
divorce cannot be left completely to the disposition of his parents. (J. Goldstein & Gitter, supra
note 12, at 88, 92, who would grant party status to the children in divorce actions. Whether or
not personal jurisdiction over persons claiming custody is necessary in order to make the decree
binding on them is another question which is discussed infra at notes 94-108.
86. See A. WATSON. supra note 7, at 197. Section 7(0 calls attention to the ract that the
custody issue may be separated from the divorce issue. Courts with migratory divorce jurisdiction
could speed up matters by declining jurisdiction with respect to custody as early as possible in
the proceedings so that a custody action in an appropriate court can immediately be instituted.
See also § 24.
87. See. e.g.. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 57, § 79.
88. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429,431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925) (Justice Cardozo).
89. "'The state in which the child is physically present must have power to take the
necessary steps for his protection . . . .[A] court of a state where the child is only physically
present at the time will refuse to entertain the action unless it believes this to be necessary for
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Cardozo said, the limits of this jurisdiction are suggested by its origin.
The presence of the child "may not be used as a pretence for the
adjudication of the status of parents . ..nor for the definition of
parental rights dependent upon status.""0 It follows that this is an
extraordinary jurisdiction reserved for emergency circumstances."' It is
not intended for the settlement of custody disputes between parents or
others. Section 3(a)(3) of the Act accordingly limits this emergency
jurisdiction based on physical presence of the child to cases of
abandonment or to emergency situations of neglect or mistreatment.
This jurisdiction is in most states exercised by a juvenile court. Physical
presence of the child may also be sufficient for a residual jurisdiction
provided by section 3(a)(4) of the Act to assure the parties of a forum
when no other court has or is prepared to exercise jurisdiction under
the two main criteria of the Act.
(f) Resolving conflicts.-While jurisdiction may exist in more
than one state under the "home state" and "strong contacts" clauses,
jurisdiction may not be exercised concurrently in two or more states.
Two mechanisms are provided to avert conflicting jurisdiction. First,
priority of filing of the petition determines which of the courts that
have jurisdiction may proceed with the case-the subsequent court will
yield its jurisdiction to the prior one under section 6(a).11 Sections 6(b)
and 6(c) assure that courts will be informed of pending prior
proceedings in other states involving the same child. Direct interstate
contacts between courts are expected and encouraged in order to carry
out the Act's strong policy against competitive and conflicting
proceedings in custody cases. Secondly, jurisdiction may be declined by
one of the courts under the inconvenient forum principle. The Act
contains an elaborate provision in section 7, specifically tailored to
child custody cases, which is intended to encourage judicial restraint in
exercising jurisdiction whenever another state appears to be in a better
position to determine custody of a child. Again, direct interstate
the best interests of the child." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS. supra note
57, § 79, comment a, at 296-97.
90. Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429,431, 148 N.E. 624, 625 (1925).
91. "In emergency situations we might also ascribe jurisdiction to take necessary temporary
measures to any state in which the child is merely physically present." Rheinstein, supra note
59, at 64. See also Ratner, supra note 41, at 812; Application of Lang. 9 App. Div. 2d 401. 193
N.Y.S.2d 763 (1959).
92. See Currie, supra note 38, at 89 n.3, suggesting abstention from the exercise of
jurisdiction "in deference to the mere pendency of an action in another state" to be "in full
accord with what appears to be the spirit" of the full faith and credit clause. See also Brazy v.
Brazy, 5 Wis. 2d 352, 92 N. W.2d 738 (1959).
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judicial communication and cooperation are anticipated under this
provision in order to make the principle fully workable and to assure
a proper forum to the parties.
Both mechanisms may often be combined. If the court with power
to proceed with the case under the priority of filing rule determines that
the subsequent court is the more appropriate forum, it may, under
sections 6(a) and 6(c), yield jurisdiction to that court.
These rules are designed primarily to avoid conflicting jurisdiction
in initial custody proceedings. Once a custody decree has been
rendered, the original court has preferential jurisdiction under section
14 .13 If, however, the original court's jurisdiction has ended, conflicts
that might arise among subsequent courts would again be resolved with
the aid of the first-in-time or forum non conveniens principle.
Once the channels of communication have been opened among the
courts, it should not take much time to settle questions of jurisdiction.
Section 24 of the Act calls attention to the need for speed and
expedition in this regard. Inter-court communications by telephone or
telegraph in custody cases may be the answer.
E. Persons Bound by Custody Decree
Suppose husband and wife live separately in the matriionial home
state and the children stay with the mother. With the husband's consent
the wife and children move to state B where the wife has found
employment. The husband's first visit to the children is one year later
when, pretending to take the children to a park, he drives them to his
parents in state C. He then returns to state A. The wife immediately
starts divorce and custody proceedings in state B. There is no question
that the court in state B has custody jurisdiction under the "home
state" clause of the Act. The husband in state A and the grandparents
in state C were made party defendants and were served by registered
mail, and the return receipts came back signed by them. The defendants
failed to appear for a hearing, either in person or by attorney. The
grandparents informed the wife by letter that they would keep the
children until their son remarried in a year or two and would then turn
them over to him. The court in state B,. after receiving evidence from
state A, and the report of a social study in state B, issued a divorce
decree awarding custody of the children to the wife with visitation
privileges for the husband under condition that he post bond to insure
the children's return after each visit.
93. See text accompanying notes 113-22 infra.
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The case of May v. Anderson" has raised a doubt as to whether,
under circumstances such as th'ese, a custody decree rendered in one
state is binding on a person in another state and recognizable by that
state. If the decree in the illustration does not bind the husband or the
grandparents, the custody proceedings were an idle gesture, and the
wife will have to start over in the courts of state A and state C and
perhaps in more states to which the children may be taken to escape
from the mother's pursuit; if this is the law, she may despair of it and
turn to self-help, surreptitiously removing the children from the
grandparents' grip. This is exactly the kind of evil the Uniform Act is
intended to prevent.
In the sixteen years since May v. Anderson was decided, the case
has been severely criticized" and has had little practical effectP' Its
inconclusive plurality opinion by Justice Burton 7 has been interpreted
to mean what Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion said it meant,
namely, that other states are authorized to recognize as binding on
their resident a custody decision of another state in which personal
jurisdiction over this resident was not obtained." The Uniform Act has
been drafted on the basis of this interpretation. Any other reading of
the case would have a seriously unsettling effect on the lives of
countless children. A child's security could be shattered years later by
a party to the proceedings who claims thai although he was duly
notified out of state the decree did not preclude his rights to custody.
That the Burton opinion in May v. Anderson caused the
Commissioners some headaches, cannot be denied. In fact, several of
the tentative drafts contained long-arm provisions to avoid the harmful
effect of that opinion on the lives of interstate children."9 This course
94. 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
95. The most stringent criticism is found in Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion. See text
accompanying notes 21-23 supra. See also H. CLARK. supra note 10, at 323-26: Currie. Justice
Traynor and the Conflict of Laws. in SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONLICT Ot, LAWS 629. 677-80
(1963); H. GOODRICH. CONFLICT OF LAWS. § 136. at 274 (4th ed. E. Scoles 1964); Hazard. Aa.i
v. Anderson: Preamble io Family Law Chaos. 45 VA. L. REv. 379 (1959).
96. Foster, Domestic Relations. 23 U. Pir. L. REv. 465-78 (1961-62): Comment, supra
note 85. But Wisconsin codified the plurality holding of the case in Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.05
(Supp. 1968); see 1961 Wis. L. REv. 347; H. CLARK. CASES AND PROBLI IS ON DONILSTIC
RELATIONS 524 (1965).
97. Justice Burton was joined by only three Justices: three members of the Court dissented
and Justice Frankfurter concurred on other grounds. One Justice did not participate.
98. See. e.g.. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT oI LAWS. supra note 57, § 79.
comment c. See also Currie, supra note 38. at 113, expressing the belief "that the decision is
narrowly limited by the circumstances of the case."
99. As to the use of long-arm statutes in the family law area, see R. CRANITON & D.
CURRIE. CONFLICT OF LAWS. CASES-CO.INIENTs-QuEsTIONs 687 (1968). See also Smith v. Smith.
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of action was abandoned, however, when it was realized that it would
be difficult to stretch the long arm far enough to reach abductors in
cases like the previous illustration where the husband has never been a
resident of the adjudicating state and the child is not present in that
state. Moreover, it was felt that a workable interstate custody law
could not be built with or around the plurality opinion in May v.
Anderson in which Justice Burton had intimated that the case was
mainly concerned with parental rights and not with the issue of the
future interests of the children. 00 As Professor Clark remarked, it is
"difficult to see how any dispute over custody can be separated from
the interests of the children.""'
The issue raised by May v. Anderson will become of greater
practical importance once the free and easy modifiability of out-of-
9tate custody decrees is ended. It is therefore necessary to give a further
explanation for section 12 of the Act which provides:
A custody decree rendered by a court of this State which had jurisdiction under
section 3 binds all parties who have been served in this State or notified in
accordance with section 5 or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court,
and who have been given an opportunity to be heard. As to these parties the
custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and as to the
custody determination made unless and until that determination is modified
pursuant to law, including the provisions of this Act.
There is a question whether May v. Anderson was concerned with the
subject of this section-the intrastate validity of custody decrees.1'2-
Whatever the answer to this question, it was necessary for a uniform
state law to lay a firm basis for the interstate recognition of custody
decrees by clarifying first when a custody decree satisfies internal due
process requirements.
Section 12, along with section 13 on interstate recognition, can be
justified on two alternative grounds: first, the traditional notion, which
has been retained by the new proposed Restatement,0M that custody
determinations are proceedings in rem or proceedings affecting status;
or second, an evolving theory that minimum contacts of the state with
the matter in litigation combined with fairness to the parties permit
state judicial action binding on persons beyond its territorial limits,
45 Cal. 2d 235, 288 P.2d 497 (1955); Soulel. Soule, 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417
(1961); Mizner v. Mizner, 439 P.2d 679 (Nev.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
100. 345 U.S. at 533.
101. H. C.ARK. supra note 10, at 324 n.36.
102. See A. tIJIRI:NzWIiIt & D. LOuISELI.. JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL § 14, at 76 (2d
ed. 1968).
103. See RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT oiF LAWS. supra note 57, §§ 69, 79.
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irrespective of whether an action in rem or in personam is involved.,"4
The latter theory is particularly appropriate in custody cases which are
sui generis since they do not readily fall into either category. The
dominant objective of attaining as permanent a solution as possible for
the benefit of the child outweighs any other considerations. The
necessary minimum connection with the litigation is assured under the
Act by the jurisdictional prerequisites of section 3 which require not
only minimum, but maximum contact. The fact that the child whose
custody is claimed has his home in the state or has other strong
contacts with the state gives any claimant ample connection with the
state of adjudication.' 5 This, along with proper notification and
opportunity to be heard under sections 4 and 5, satisfies the
requirement of fairness to all parties.
If the reason for desiring personal jurisdiction in the strict sense
is to bring all the custody claimants before the court so that the judge
can hear and see them and make a personal evaluation, and to give
them an opportunity to present their evidence,' this aim is not often
attained by a requirement of personal jurisdiction. Technical
jurisdiction via the long arm or appearance through an attorney is
commonly the result.07 To assure personal appearance of the parties
and of the child, the Act, in sections 11, 18, 19, and 20, uses other
means which are superior to technical personal jurisdiction. For
example, travel expenses may be advanced or reimbursed.' The courts
are strongly encouraged to insist on the personal appearance of the
parties and of the child, if necessary, with the aid of a court order issued
in the state of a" person's residence. If travel to the adjudicating court
is not practically feasible, out-of-state depositions or hearings before a
court in another state may be arranged by the court on its own motion.
104. See Hazard, A General Theoryj of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 241.
Professor Hazard shows in this article that as a result of decisions like Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950), on the one hand, and International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945), on the other, the distinction between actions in rem and in personam is
disappearing and that the two lines of cases are converging in the rule that a state has jurisdiction
if the litigation has local elements and reasonable notification has been given to persons concerned
who are out-of-state. Under this theory there is no need for long-arm provisions.
105. See Ratner, Child Custody in a FederalSYstem. 62 MicH. L. REV. 795, 826-27 (1964).
106. See Rheinstein, supra note 59, at 57, 63.
107. See Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
108. See Foster, supra note 44. if none of the parties are in a financial position to pay the
travel cost, other sources of payment may be found. The Act leaves this possibility open; but the
child custody problems of the very poor seem to be as a rule of a different nature. See Kay &
Phillips, Poverty and the Law of Child Custody. 54 CALIF. L. REv. 717 (1966).
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The opportunity of a custody claimant to have his side of the argument
considered by the court is thus amply provided.
Other provisions of the Act are designed to settle in one single
proceeding all claims to the custody of the same child. The parties are
required under section 9 to inform the court of any additional person
they know who claim-s custody or visitation rights or has physical
custody of the child. Under section 10, these persons and others about
whom the judge learns from other sources must be joined as parties.
F. Interstate Recognition and Enforcement
From the standpoint of its most immediate practical effect, the
Act might have been named the Uniform Child Custody Judgment
Recognition and Enforcement Act. Section 13 on recognition and
section 15 on enforcement, together with section 14 which limits
relitigations in other states, are the key provisions which will assure a
great measure of interstate stability of custody decrees.
Whether demanded by full faith and credit or not, the states may
recognize and enforce the custody decrees of other states,' and they
may do so by the enactment of this uniform law. That interstate
recognition is an absolute necessity today has been demonstrated
before. The fact that the custody judgment is not a final one is no
obstacle to recognition. It can be recognized and enforced until
modified."'
Recognition under section 13 is mandatory only in the case of
those custody decrees which have met the jurisdictional standards of
the Act. Discretionary recognition beyond this legislative mandate is
not prohibited, but custody decrees which contravene the basic policies
of the Act, such as a decree obtained by a child abductor after a few
days' presence in a state, should not be recognized.
A custody judgment which is recognized under section 13 Is
automatically enforceable in another state by filing a certified copy of
the decree with the clerk of the appropriate court. As provided by
section 15, a decree, in effect, becomes a custody decree of the state in
which it is filed as of the moment of filing. This speedy method of
enforcement has been derived from the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act."'
109. See EHRENVZWEIG. supra note 62, at 167.
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, supra note 57, § 109 (2). See also Ratner,
supra note41, at 829-30.
I11. 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED § 2; cf. Note, Interstate Enforcement of Modifiable
Alimony and Child Support Decrees, 54 IOWA L. REv. 597 (1969).
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Contempt proceedings or other proceedings that might arise in the
enforcing state do not open up the custody decree to petitions for
modifications. If modification is desired, section 14 requires that the
petition be directed to the court which has jurisdiction to modify.' 2 The
only valid objection in the enforcing state is a claim that the decree is
not entitled to recognition.
G. Jurisdiction to Modify
Interstate recognition alone does not suffice to remedy the
present instability of custody decrees. Under the rule of HalveI v.
Halvey,13 a court may well accord recognition to a sister state decree,
but then proceed to modify it on the ground or pretext of changed
conditions. Indeed, this practice is at the root of the present wilderness
in custody law."4
Section 14 of the Act, therefore, restricts modifications of out-of-
state custody decrees." 5 In order to modify a custody decree of another
state, the court must first have jurisdiction under section 3; second, the
jurisdiction of the prior court must have ceased or that court must have
declined to exercise its modification jurisdiction. In other words, a
person seeking a modification of a custody decree must address his
petition to the prior custody court unless that court no longer has
jurisdiction under the "home state" or "strong contacts" test. The fact
that the court had previously considered the case and has the case file
among its records, is one factor favoring its continued jurisdiction. But
once all the persons involved have moved away or the contact with the
state has otherwise become slight, modification jurisdiction moves
elsewhere, and the transcript of the record and other documents of the
original custody court are transmitted to the next court.",
In fact, section 14 is nothing but an extension of the mandate of
recognition of section 13. Most courts which render custody decrees
retain continuing jurisdiction under the local law. Courts in other states
often assume jurisdiction to modify without regard to this pre-existing
and continuing jurisdiction of the prior court."7 Section 14 directs the
112. See Ratner, supra note 41, at 832-36.
113. 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
114. See. e.g., Ratner, supra notes 41 & 42.
115. Another restriction on the modification of out-of-state custody decrees exists under the
clean hands doctrine of section 8, discussed infra.
116. On the desirability of building on the evidence relied on by the prior court, see Paulsen
& Best, Appointment of a Guardian in the Conflict of Laws. 45 IowA L. RLv. 212, 226 (1960).
Ehrenzweig, supra note 2, at 7, 9, II.
117. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 29, at 587-88.
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courts to respect and defer to this continuing jurisdiction as long as it
exists under the interstate standards of section 3.
A typical example is the case of the couple who are divorced in
state A, their matrimonial home state, and whose children are awarded
to the wife, subject to visitation rights of the husband. Wife and
children move to state" B, with or without permission of the court to
remove the children. State'A has continuing jurisdiction and the courts
in state B may not hear the wife's petition to make her the sole
custodian, eliminate visitation rights, or make any other modification
of the decree, even though state B has in the meantime become the
"home state" under section 3. The jurisdiction of state A continues
and is exclusive as long as the husband lives in state A unless he loses
contact with the children, for example, by not using his visitation
privileges for three years.
The jurisdiction of state A would continue after the departure Of
wife and children under the present law in most states.118 But state B
has often assumed a concurrent jurisdiction which has been the source
of a great many interstate conflicts between courts. Justice Fairchild
of Wisconsin vividly describes some of the "head-on collisions" the
courts of his state have had with courts of other states in cases of this
kind.' In Brazy v. Brazy the Supreme Court of Wisconsin directed the
trial court to defer to a court in California, but this did not end the
struggle. Under section 14 of the Act, Wisconsin would have
continuing jurisdiction in a case like Brazy and the courts of the other
states involved would have to defer to Wisconsin. It is interesting that
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin applied the principles of section 14
and. the spirit of the whole Act in Zillmer v. Zillmer120 In this case the
divorce and custody were granted to the mother in Kansas, the
matrimonial home-state. A question as to the mental condition of the
mother arose and the grandparents in Wisconsin, where the children
were then living, applied for modification of the custody decree in
Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, although noting'that
Wisconsin probably had jurisdiction, steadfastly refused to exercise this
jurisdiction for the reason that comity required that it defer to the
Kansas court. In fact, Wisconsin exercised "a sort of ancillary
jurisdiction" according to Justice Fairchild, and permitted the children
118. See H. CLARK, supra note 10, at 322-23.
119. See Fairchild, supra note 15, at 5-8. See also Brazy v. Brazy, 5 Wis. 2d 352, 92 N.W.
2d 738 (1958); Greefv. Greef, 6 Wis. 2d 269, 94 N.W.2d 625 (1959).
120. 8 Wis. 2d 657, 100 N.W. 2d 564, 101 N.W.2d 703 (1960).
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to stay with the grandparents temporarily, since some evidence of the
poor mental condition of the mother had come to the attention of the
Wisconsin courts. The custody decree was subsequently modified by the
Kansas court and custody was given to the father. As Justice Fairchild
said:
There was an atmosphere of cooperation rather than competition. The
Wisconsin courts assumed that the Kansas court would make as wise a decision
as could be made with the information available. The Kansas court decided the
matter with the assurance that its decision would be respected and enforced in
Wisconsin. 21
Section 14 is not at variance with the Halve v decision. Halve
merely declared that a custody judgment which is not final under local
law may be modified in states other than the state of rendition, but did
not decide under what circumstances another state has jurisdiction to
modify a custody decree. If a state should impose restraints on the
power of its courts to modify their initial custody decrees, a consistent
interpretation of the Halvey doctrine would seem to make these
restraints binding on other states . 2
H. The Problem of the Punitive Custody Decree
Deference to another state's custody judgment and continuing
jurisdiction becomes problematical when that state removes a child
from its home and parent for no other reason than to inflict
punishment on the parent.13 The case of Berlin v. Berlin,' which
brought the courts of Maryland and New York into open conflict, is
a typical example. Mr. and Mrs. Berlin lived in Maryland for six years
until their divorce by a Maryland court, which awarded custody of the
two children to the mother. Mrs. Berlin then moved to New York City
with the children, as perniitted by the decree, and remarried. She failed
to live up to the visitation provisions of the decree and disregarded
contempt orders issued by the Maryland court. The father saw the
children only once, two years after the divorce, when he came to New
York and with the aid of two private detectives tried forcibly to remove
the children from the state. A year later the Maryland court modified
121. Fairchild, supra note 15, at 9-10.
122. Cf Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933). But see Elkind v. Byck, 68 Cal.
2d 453, 439 P.2d 316, 67 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1968). These cases relating to child support involve
considerations, however, which differ from those involved in custody cases.
123. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 33, at 370, jn SELECTD READINGS O. CONFLICT OF LAWS
873 (M. Culp ed. 1956).
124. Berlin v. Berlin, 239 Md. 52, 210 A.2d 389 (1965); Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371,
235 N.E.2d 109. 288 N.Y.S.2d 44 (1967), cert. denied. 393 U.S. 840 (1968).
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its original decree and awarded custody to the father. This decision was
upheld on appeal on the ground that the mother, "besides disregarding
the visitation rights of the father,_ exhibited contempt for the lawful
orders of the awarding court .... 111 Thereupon, Mrs. Berlin applied
to a court in New York for custody of her children and her petition
was granted. The Court of Appeals of New York, although conscious
of the need to end custody litigation and to abide by a decree of a prior
court whenever possible, found itself unable to recognize the Maryland
decree:
[W]e have here a situation where both parties are fit to rear the children, although
they unfortunately have been unable to subordinate their own conflicts to the
welfare of their children. The boys, however, have been in the continuous custody
of their mother since the couple's divorce, almost 8 years. They have been
attending school in New York and have no doubt established friendships here and
adjusted to the difficulties which have been engendered by their parents' marital
difficulties. Moreover, in the years that have followed the Maryland custody
decree, the children have barely seen their father. It cannot be said that a change
in custody (required by adherence to the prior Maryland custody decree)" which
could have a disruptive effect on the lives of these young children, is in their best
interests1
Cases like Berlin seem to occur with increasing frequency. 2 7 A
custody court's orders-usually visitation orders-are violated by a
parent who has left the state and the court in helpless anger over this
affront to its dignity gives custody to the other parent. As a California
court stated in a similar situation, the mother "was not a fit and
proper person . .. in view of her persistent defiance of court orders
"'128
It is clear that the dignity of the court has taken precedence in
these cases over the interest of the child in the stability ofhis home.
The child has been punished in order to discipline his parent. We
cannot expect other courts to recognize such decrees. On the other
hand, continued contact between the child and the non-custodial parent
is important not only to the parent, but usually to the child as well.
125. Berlin v. Berlia, 239 Md. 52, 59, 210 A.2d 380, 384 (1965).
126. Berlin v. Berlin, 21 N.Y.2d 371, 376, 235 N.E.2d 109, 112, 288 N.Y.S.2d 44, 48
(1967).
127. See, e.g.. In re Guardianship of Rogers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966); Moniz
v. Moniz, 142 Cal. App. 2d 527, 298 P.2d 710 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Stout v. Pate, 120 Cal.
App. 2d 699, 261 P.2d 788 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 968 (1954); State ex rel.
Fox v. Webster, 151 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1963); Stout v Pate, 209 Ga. 786, 75 S.E.2d 748 (1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 968 (1954); Sharpe v. Sharpe, 77 Ill. App. 2d 295, 222 N.E.2d 340 (1966).
128. Moniz v. Moniz, 142 Cal. App. 2d 527, 530, 298 P.2d 710, 712 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956)
(conclusidn of the trial court referred to with approval by the appellate court).
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Visitation rights granted in a custody decree must be respected and
observed.
What is the solution under the Act to this serious problem? Since
the reason for the punitive decree is the present lack of power of a court
to enforce its visitation provisions in another state, the first remedy is
to use the enforcement provisions of section 15. This section applies to
the enforcement not only of the primary right to custody, but also to
the enforcement of other provisions contained in the custody decree.
Here, as elsewhere in carrying out the letter and spirit of the Act,
cooperation of the enforcing state is vital. Payment of travel and other
expenses, including attorneys' fees, may be imposed on the violator
under section 15(b).
In order to avoid this problem, it will also be necessary for the
initial custody court to see to it that visitation provisions are drafted
carefully, anticipating the possible departure of the custodial parent
from the state. An alternative would be to include a provision in the
decree-that visitation privileges are to be redetermined before departure.
The decree could specify that any failure to apply for redetermination
or any failure to comply with original or altered visitation requirements
will be met with enforcement and imposition of costs in another state)"
Jurisdiction to modify visitation arrangements usually remains with the
initial custody court so that, in any event, a court in another state to
which a petition for changes in visiting privileges is addressed, will
refer the petitioner back to the original court.
Thus the occasions for the use of.the punitive decree in custody
cases will decrease under the Act and should cease altogether as
judicial cooperation increases among the courts of the various states.
It is doubtful that there is ever justification for punitive custody changes
which disrupt a child's life merely to uphold the authority of a court,
especially since the disciplinary measure usually leads to further
defiance of the court and lack of respect for the punitive measures by
other courts. As Justice Breitel observed:
The dignity of the several courts would be preserved, but the welfare of the
children would be destroyed. The answer is, of course, that the parents' contempts
of the courts must be a subordinate consideration.
The New York courts can well survive this offense to their dignity; the children
should not, however, suffer further offense to their welfare.130
129. Also, the posting of security to insure compliance with the terms of the custody decree
may be required, as is the practice in some courts today. See Greef v. Greef, 6 Wis. 2d 269, 94
N.W.2d 625 (1959); 2 H. FOSTER & FREED, LAW AND THE FAMILY 562 (1966).
130. Application of Lang, 9 App. Div. 2d 401, 405, 410, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763, 767, 771
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I. Deterrence ofSelf-Help Measures
If the Act's jurisdictional standards for initial and modification
decrees are faithfully observed and recognition is accorded to the
custody -decrees and the continuing jurisdiction of other states, child
abductions and other self-help measures should prove useless to gain
legal custody of a child. The "seize and run" artist who snatches a
child and takes him to another state before there has been a custody
adjudication cannot obtain a custody decree by his mere presence and
the presence of the child in the state: If he waits six months to bring
himself under the "home state" rule and the court in the prior home
state has not yet taken jurisdiction, the court in the second state may
decline to exercise jurisdiction because under section 7(c)(5) this
"would contravene . ..the purposes stated in section 1." The clean
hands principle aside, if he tried spiriting away the child after custody
had been awarded to someone else, a court in the second state would
send him back to seek a modification under section 14 in the original
court. Even if the removal of the child was "legal" for purposes of a
permitted visit in another state, he could not during the period of
visitation obtain a changed custody decree in another state,' 31 since that
state would recognize the prior decree and take no action to change it.
Often the principle of comity recognition and respect for the
-ontinuing jurisdiction of the prior court solves the self-help problem.
For example, in Application of Lang a New York court refused to
interfere with a Swiss court's custody orders in the case of two young
Swiss boys who had been repeatedly abducted across the ocean by their
parents. Justice Breitel, speaking for the court, declared:
Adherence to the principle of comity provides the key to rational disposition for
the welfare of the children, not only in this case, but in many, if not most, of the
custody cases involving self-help. And for this reason: comity makes futile and
thus discourages the resort to self-help which in the custody dispute is an
irresponsible and barbaric remedy. Not only does self-help make the eventual
placement of the.children an arbitrary consequence but it breeds reprisal in kind,
as, indeed, happened in this case.13
2
The Justice said that "the crux of the matter here is that only by
withholding the power may the interests of the children be served." 13
(1959); cf. Hull v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 2d 139, 151, 352 P.2d 161, 168, 5 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1960)
(Traynor, J. concurring).
131. See the facts in Brocker v. Brocker, 429 Pa. 513, 241 A.2d 366 (1968).
132. Application of Lang, 9 App. Div. 2d 401, 408, 193 N.Y.S.2d 763, 770 (1959). The
same result would be reached under section 23, on international application, of the Uniform Act.
133. Id. at 407, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 768.
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As outlined so far, the Uniform Act leaves a few loopholes, and
section 8 codifies the "clean hands" principle in order to close them.
For example, if the original custody court in state A has lost
modification jurisdiction under section 14, a father-abductor could, if
he retains the child in state B for six months, establish "home state"
jurisdiction there. But a court in state B, if it does not decline
jurisdiction under section 7, would refuse to hear the father's petition
for modification under section 8(b). The Act applies the clean hands
rule to initial as well as modification proceedings, although the rule is
entirely discretionary in the case of initial custody proceedings. For
example, if there has been a de facto separation under an agreement
that the children remain with the wife, and the father snatches them
one day while they are playing in their yard and takes them to another
state, a court in the second state may well decline to hear the case even
after there is "home state" jurisdiction.
If the taking or retention violates a custody order, denial of
jurisdiction is mandatory, unless it is necessary to assume jurisdiction
in the interest of the child. The "unless" clause is of great importance
because denial of jurisdiction is a punitive measure against a parent,
which must not be allowed to result in harm to-the child. Although
withholding jurisdiction is not as drastic a punishment as taking the
child from his custodian, there are various situations in which the clean
hands rule cannot be applied because it would be detrimental to the
child.' The child abductor may be charged under section 8(c) with the
expenses of other parties who are forced to assert their rights against
him in a distant state.
J. Interstate Judicial Assistance
Section 1 lists prominently among the purposes of the Act the
desire to "avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of
other states in matters of child custody" and the desire to "promote
and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual
assistance between the courts" of the various states in custody cases.
These are not empty words. In cases of interstate children, one
court operating in isolation cannot do justice to the child or the
litigants. A large portion of the relevant facts may be in another state,
or the evidence may be dispersed over three or four states. The judge
134. See. e.g., In re Guardianship of Rodgers, 100 Ariz. 269, 413 P.2d 744 (1966); in re
Walker, 228 Cal. App. 2d 217, 39 Cal. Rptr. 243 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Smith v. Smith, 135
Cal. App. 2d 100, 286 P.2d 1009 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
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needs the help of courts in these other states when he determines his
jurisdiction, when he considers whether or not to decline jurisdiction,
when the evidence is to be gathered from out of state, when his
visitation orders are to be enforced, and when he takes over from
another custody court which lost its continuing jurisdiction.
We have seen that there is not an exact answer to the question of
jurisdiction in every case. On the other hand, a court in one state must
assume responsibility for the custody of a particular child. If the court
that is chosen under the tests the Act provides undertakes this task on
behalf of all the states involved and with their assistance, we may
recognize the truth of Professor Bradway's wise words-that it matters
less which court takes jurisdiction, but that the courts of the several
states concerned join in the effort and act in partnership to bring about
the best possible solution for the child's future.135
We have mentioned those decrees which are partial to the local
resident and may therefore cause resistance to recognition by other
states. Such decrees are undoubtedly due in many cases not to any
prejudice in favor of the local petitioner, but to the one-sided nature
of the evidence presented to the court. The petitioner's own story and
his own witnesses are often all the evidence the judge has before him
when making the custody decision. The Act contains a number of
provisions to assure the gathering of the out-of-state facts which do not
reach the court through the adversary process.13 The court itself takes
an active part in obtaining the evidence through the assistance of courts
in other states. The judge is thus able to broaden his field of vision
beyond state boundaries and can arrive at a fully informed judgment
which considers all claimants, residents and non-residents alike, on an
equal basis and in relation to the welfare of the child.
Ill. CONCLUSION
The need to extricate interstate children from their present
predicament is evident. If we continue our present course of unending
custody litigations in state after state, and of placing a premium on
self-help measures to gain possession of the child, the number of
children caught in the net of interstate judicial conflict will continue to
grow, to their lasting detriment and the detriment of society. The
135. Bradway, supra note 46. See also Ehrenzweig, supra note 2; Ehrenzweig, supra note
33, at 372, in SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 839 (M. Culp ed. 1956); Fairchild,
supra note 15.
136. See §§ 6, 9, 10, 16-22.
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Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act promises to remedy this
intolerable state of affairs. By centering jurisdiction in a court which
is close to much of the relevant evidence and by providing new modes
of gathering additional facts out-of-state, the Act gives assurance that
the original custody determination will, to the extent humanly possible,
be an informed and carefully considered decree. By declaring that this
decree will be respected and enforced by other states without
relitigating the custody issue, the Act assures the interstate child of
stability and continuity of his home and takes the wind out of child
snatchings and other maneuvers to gain legal custody of a child in the
courts of a distant state or country.
In doing so, the Act calls for new judicial approaches, some trans-
state thinking, and "extralitigious" procedures to supplement the strict
adversary process which are not novelties to custody judges in many
states. It should not prove difficult to open up lines of communication
with courts of other states to iron out jurisdictional problems and to
obtain mutual assistance in the collection of the facts. Judicial
conferences on a regional or national level could well achieve agreement
on the necessary forms and court rules to make interstate cooperation
in custody litigation a reality.
Courts in states which have not adopted the Act may put into
operation those provisions of the Act which are within their judicial
discretion without awaiting legislative action. But the full benefits of
the Uniform Act cannot be attained until state legislatures have
enacted it into law.
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APPENDIX
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACTt
SECTION 1. [Purposes ofAct; Construction of Provisions.]
(a) The general purposes of this Act are to:
(1) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other states in
matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the shifting of children from
state to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
(2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a custody
decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the interest of the
child;
(3) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily
in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and where
significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training, and personal relationships
is most readily available, and that courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction
when the child and his family have a closer connection with another state;
(4) discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of
greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the child;
(5) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to
obtain custody awards;
(6) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states in this state insofar as
feasible;
(7) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states;
(8) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of mutual
assistance between the courts of this state and those of other states concerned with the
same child; and
(9) make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
(b) This Act shall be construed to promote the general purposes stated in this section.
SECTION 2. [Definitions.] As used in this Act:
(1) "contestant" means a person, including a parent, who claims a right to
custody or visitation rights with respect to a child;
(2) "custody determination" means a court decision and court orders and
instructions providing for the custody of a child, including visitation rights; it does not
include a decision relating to child support or any other monetary obligation of any
person;
(3) "custody proceeding" includes proceedings in which. a custody determination
is one of several issues, such as an action for divorce or separation, and includes child
neglect and dependency proceedings;
(4) "decree" or "custody decree" means a custody determination contained in
a judicial decree or order made in a custody* proceeding, and includes the initial decree
and a modification decree;
(5) "home state" means the state in which the child immediately preceding the
time involved lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least
6 consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than 6 months old the state in
which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Periods of
temporary absence of any of the named persons are counted as part of the 6-month
or other period;
(6) "initial decree" means the first custody decree concerning a particular child;
(7) "modification decree" means a custody decree which modifies or replaces a
tPrinted without Prefatory Note and Comments.
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prior decree, whether made by the court which rendered the prior decree or by another
court;
(8) "physical custody" means actual possession and control of a child;
(9) "person acting as parent" means a person, other than a parent, who has
physical custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody by a court or
claims a right to custody; and
(10) "state" means any state, territory, or possession of the United States, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia.
SECTION 3. [Jurisdiction.]
(a) A court of this State which is competent to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree if:
(1) this State (i) is the home state of the child at the time of commencement of
the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home state within 6 months before
commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this State because of
his removal or retention by a person claiming his custody or for other reasons, and a
parent or person acting as parent continues to live in this State; or
(2) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of this State assume
jurisdiction because (i) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection with this State, and (ii) there is available in
this State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships; or
(3) the child is physically present in this State and (i) the child has been
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has
been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected
[or dependent]; or
(4) * (i) it-appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites
substantially in accordance with paragraphs (1), (2), or (3), or another state has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this State is the more appropriate
forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the
child that this court assume jurisdiction.
(b) Except under paragraphs (3) and (4) of subsection (a), physical presence in this
State of the child, or of the child and one of the contestants, is not alone sufficient to
confer jurisdiction on a court of this State to make a child custody determination.
(c) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a prerequisite forjurisdiction
to determine his custody.
SECTION 4. [Notice and Opportunity to be Heard.] Before making a decree under
this Act, reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the
contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated, and
any person who has physical custody of the child. If any of these persons is outside
this State, notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given pursuant to section 5.
SECTION 5. [Notice to Persons Outside this State; Subnission to Jurisdiction.]
(a) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction over a person outside this State
shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, and may be:
(1) by personal delivery outside this State in the manner prescribed for service
of process within this State;
(2) in the manner prescribed by the law of the place in which the service is made
for service of process in that place in an action in any of its courts of general
jurisdiction;
(3) by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requesting a
receipt; or
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(4) as directed by the court [including publication, if other means of notification
are ineffective].
(b) Notice under this section shall be served, mailed, or delivered, [or last published]
at least [10, 20] days before any hearing in this State.
(c) Proof of service outside this State may be made by affidavit of the individual who
made the service, or in the manner prescribed by the law of this State, the order
pursuant to which the service is made, or the law of the place in which the service is
made. If service is made by mail, proof may be a receipt signed by the addressee or
other evidence of delivery to the addressee.
(d) Notice is not required if a person submits to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECTION 6. [Simultaneous Proceedings in Other States.]
(a) A court of this State shall not exercise its jurisdiction under this Act if at the
time of filing the petition a proceeding concerning the custody of the child was pending
in a court of another state exercising jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this
Act, unless the proceeding is stayed by the court of the other state because this State
is a more appropriate forum or for other reasons.
(b) Before hearing the petition in a custody proceeding the court shall examine the
pleadings and other information supplied by the parties under section 9 and shall
consult the child custody registry established under section 16 concerning the pendency
of proceedings with respect to the child in other states. If the court has reason to believe
that proceedings may be pending in another state it shall direct an inquiry to the state
court administrator or other appropriate official of the other state.
(c) If the court is informed during the course of the proceeding that a proceeding
concerning the custody of the child was pending in another state before the court
assumed jurisdiction it shall stay the proceeding and communicate with the court in
which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be litigated in the
more appropriate forum and that information be exchanged in accordance with
sections 19 through 22. If.a court of this state has made a custody decree before being
informed of a pending proceeding in a court of another state it shall immediately
inform that court of the fact. If the court is informed that a proceeding was
commenced in another state after it assumed jurisdiction it shall likewise inform the
other court to the end that the issues may be litigated in the more appropriate forum.
SECTION 7. [Inconvenient Forum.]
(a) A court which has jurisdiction under this Act to make an initial or modification
decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it
finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under the
circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is a more appropriate
forum.
(b) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the court's own motion or
upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem or other representative of the child.
(c) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if it is in
the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may
take into account the following factors, among others:
(I) if another state is or recently was the child's home state;
(2) if another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or with
the child and one or more of the contestants;
(3) if substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available in another
state;
(4) if the partfes have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate; and
(5) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene any
of the purposes stated in section I.
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(d) Before determining whether to decline or retain jurisdiction the court may
communicate with a court of another state and exchange information pertinent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by either court with a view to assuring that jurisdiction will
be exercised by the more appropriate court and that a forum will be available to the
parties.
(e) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum and that a court of another
state is a more appropriate forum, it may dismiss the proceedings, or it may stay the
proceedings upon condition that a custody proceeding be promptly commenced in
another named state or upon any other conditions which may be just and proper,
including the condition that a moving party stipulate his consent and submission to
the jurisdiction of the other forum.
(0 The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this Act if a custody
determination is incidental to an action for divorce or another proceeding while
retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other proceeding.
(g) If it appears to the court that it is clearly an inappropriate forum it may require
the party who commenced the proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs of the
proceedings, in this State, necessary travel and other expenses, including attorneys'
fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses. Payment is to be made to the clerk
of the court for remittance to the proper party.
(h) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this section the court shall inform
the court found to be the more appropriate forum of this fact, or if the court which
would have jurisdiction in the other state is not certainly known, shall transmit the
information to the court administrator or other appropriate official for forwarding to
the appropriate court.
(i) Any communication received from another state informing this State of a finding
of inconvenient forum because a court of this State is the more appropriate forum shall
be filed in the custody registry of the appropriate court. Upon assuming jurisdiction
the court of this State shall inform the original court of this fact.
SECTION 8. [Jurisdiction Declined by Reason of Conduct.]
(a) If the petitioner for an initial decree has wrongfully taken the child from another
state or has engaged in similar reprehensible conduct the court may decline to exercise
jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
(b) Unless required in the interest of the child, the court shall not exercise its
jurisdiction to modify a custody decree of another state if the petitioner, without
consent of the person entitled to custody, has improperly removed the child from the
physical custody of the person entitled to custody or has improperly retained the child
after a visit or other temporary relinquishment of physical custody. If the petitioner
has violated any other provision of a custody decree of another state the court may
decline to exercise its jurisdiction if this is just and proper under the circumstances.
(c) In appropriate cases a court dismissing a petition under this section may charge
the petitioner with necessary travel and other expenses, including attorneys' fees,
incurred by other parties or their witnesses.
SECTION 9. [Information under Oath to be Submitted to the Court.]
(a) Every party in a custody proceeding in his first pleading or in an affidavit
attached to that pleading shall give information under oath as to the child's present
address, the places where the child has lived within the last 5 years, and the names
and present addresses of the persons with whom the child has lived during that period.
In this pleading or affidavit every party shall further declare under oath whether:
(1) he has participated (as a party, witness, or in any other capacity) in any other
litigation concerning the custody of the same child in this or any other state;
(2) he has information of any custody proceeding concerning the child pending
in a court of this or any other state; and
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(3) he knows of any person not a party to the proceedings who has physical
custody of the child or claims to have custody or visitation rights with respect to the
child.
(b) If the declaration as to any of the above items is in the affirmative the declarant
shall give additional information under oath as required by the court. The court may
examine the parties under oath as to details of the information furnished and as to
other matters pertinent to the court's jurisdiction and the disposition of the case.
(c) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any custody proceeding
concerning the child in this or any other state of which he obtained information during
this proceeding.
SECTION 10. [Additional Parties.] If the court learns from information furnished
by the parties pursuant to section 9 or from other sources that a person not a party
to the custody proceeding has physical custody of the child or claims to have custody
or visitation rights with respect to the child, it shall order that person to be joined as
a party and to be duly notified of the pendency of the proceeding and of his joinder
as a party. If the person joined as a party is outside this State he shall be served with
process or otherwise notified in accordance with section 5.
SECTION 11. [Appearance of Parties and the Child.]
[(a) The court may order any party to the proceeding who is in this State to appear
personally before the court. If that party has physical custody of the child the court
may order that he appear personally with the child.]
(b) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is desired by the court is outside
this State with or without the child the court may order that the notice given under
section 5 include a statement directing that party to appear personally with or without
the child and declaring that failure to appear may result in a decision adverse to that
party.
(c) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this State is directed to appear under
subsection (b) or desires to appear personally before the court with or without the child,
the court may require another party to pay to the clerk of the court travel and other
necessary expenses of the party so appearing and of the child if this is just and proper
under the circumstances.
SECTION 12. [Binding Force and Res Judicata Effect of Custody Decree.] A
custody decree rendered by a court of this State which had jurisdiction under section
3 binds all parties who have been served in this State or notified in accordance with
section 5 or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who have been
given an opportunity to be heard. As to these parties the custody decree is conclusive
as to all issues of law and fact decided and as to the custody determination made unless
and until that determination is modified pursuant to law, including the provisions of
this Act.
SECTION 13. [Recognition of Out-of-State Custody Decrees.] The courts of this
State shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification decree of a court of another
state which had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially in
accordance with this Act or which was made under factual circumstances meeting the
jurisdictional standards of the Act, so long as this decree has not been modified in
accordance with jurisdictional standards substantially similar to those of this Act.
SECTION 14. [Modification of Custody Decree ofAnother State.]
(a) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this State shall
not modify that decree unless (1) it appears to the court of this State that the court
which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional
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prerequisites substantially in accordance with this Act or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) the court of this State has jurisdiction.
(b) If a court of this State is authorized under subsection (a) and section 8 to modify
a custody decree of another state it shall give due consideration to the transcript of
the record and other documents of all previous proceedings submitted to it in
accordance with section 22.
SECTION 15. [Filing and Enforcement of Custody Decree ofAnother State.]
(a) A certified copy of a custody decree of another state may be filed in the office of
the clerk of any [District Court, Family Court] of this State. The clerk shall treat the
decree in the same manner as a custody decree of the [District Court, Family Court]
of this State. A custody decree so filed has the same effect and shall be enforced in
like manner as a custody decree rendered by a court of this State.
(b) A person violating a custody decree of another state which makes it necessary to
enforce the decree in this State may be required to pay necessary travel and other
expenses, including attorneys' fees, incurred by the party entitled to the custody or his
witnesses.
SECTION 16. [Registry of Out-of-State Custody Decrees and Proceedings.] The
Clerk of each [District Court, Family Court] shall maintain a registry in which he shall
enter the following:
(1) certified copies of custody decrees of other states received for filing;
(2) communications as to the pendency of custody proceedings in other states;
(3) communications concerning a finding of inconvenient forum by a court of
another state; and
(4) other communications or documents concerning custody proceedings in
another state which may affect the jurisdiction of a court of this State or the
disposition to be made by it in a custody proceeding.
SECTION 17. [Certified Copies of Custody Decree.] The Clerk of the [District
Court, Family Court] of this State, at the request of the court of another state or at
the request of any person who is affected by or has a legitimate interest in a custody
decree, shall certify and forward a copy of the decree to that court or person.
SECTION 18. [Taking Testimony in Another State.] In addition to other procedural
devices available to a party, any party to the proceeding or a guardian ad litem or
other representative of the child may adduce testimony of witnesses, including parties
and the child, by deposition or otherwise, in another state. The court on its own motion
may direct that the testimony of a person be taken in another state and may prescribe
the manner in which and the terms upon which the testimony shall be taken.
SECTION 19. [Hearings and Studies in Another State; Orders to Appear.]
(a) A court of this State may request the appropriate court of another state to hold
a hearing to adduce evidence, to order a party to produce or give evidence under other
procedures of that state, or to have social studies made with respect to the
custody of a child involved in proceedings pending in the court of this State; and
to forward to the court of this State certified copies of the transcript of the record of
the hearing, the evidence ptherwise adduced, or any social studies prepared in
compliance with the request. The cost of the services may be assessed against the
parties or, if necessary, ordered paid by the [County, State].
(b) A court of this State may request the appropriate court of another state to order
a party to custody proceedings pending in the court of this State to appear in the
proceedings, and if that party has physical custody of the child, to appear with the
child. The request may state that travel and other necessary expenses of the party and
of the child whose appearance is desired will be assessed against another party or will
otherwise be paid.
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SECTION 20. [Assistance to Courts of Other States.]
(a) Upon request of the court of another state the courts of this State which are
competent to hear custody matters may order a person in this State to appear at a
hearing to adduce evidence or to produce or give evidence under other procedures
available in this State [or may order social studies to be made for use in a custody
proceeding in another state]. A certified copy of the transcript of the record of the
hearing or the evidence otherwise adduced [and any social studies prepared] shall be
forwarded by the clerk of the court to the requesting court.
(b) A person within this State may voluntarily give his testimony or statement in this
State for use in a custody proceeding outside this State.
(c) Upon request of the court of another state a competent court of this State may
order a person in this State to appear alone or with the child in a custody proceeding
in another state. The court may condition compliance with the request upon assurance
by the other state that travel and other necessary expenses will be advanced or
reimbursed.
SECTION 21. [Preservation of Documents for Use in Other States.] In any custody
proceeding in this State the court shall preserve the pleadings, orders and decrees, any
record that has been made of its hearings, social studies, and other pertinent documents
until the child reaches [18, 21] years of age. Upon appropriate request of the court of
another state the court shall forward to the other court certified copies of any or all
of such documents.
SECTION 22. [Request for Court Records of Another State.] If a custody decree
has been rendered in another state concerning a child involved in a custody proceeding
pending in a court of this State, the court of this State upon taking jurisdiction of the
case shall request of the court of the other state' a certified copy of the transcript of
any court record and other documents mentioned in section 21.
SECTION 23. [International Application.] The general policies of this Act extend to
the international area. The provisions of this Act relating to the recognition and
enforcement of custody decrees of other states apply to custody decrees and decrees
involving legal institutions similar in nature to custody, rendered by appropriate
authorities of other nations if reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard were given
to all affected persons.
SECTION 24. [Priority.] Upon the request of a party to a custody proceeding which
raises a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this Act the case shall
be given calendar priority and handled expeditiously.
SECTION 25. [Severability.] If any provision of this Act or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, its invalidity does not affect other
provisions or applications of the Act which can be given effect without the invalid
provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
SECTION 26. [Short Title.] This Act may be cited as the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act.




SECTION 28. [Time of Taking Effect.] This Act shall take effect. . ..

